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Abstract 
From a sample of Asian countries over the period 1999-2007, this paper investigates the link between bank 
competition and economic development. In general, although banking market power has a U-shaped relationship with 
economic growth, banking market power tends to improve economic growth. However, the positive impact of banking 
market power on economic growth only occurs in agricultural sector, but not in industrial sector. It is also shown that 
higher banking market power in countries with greater economic freedom erodes overall economic growth and 
industrial growth. On the contrary, there is no significant relationship between banking market power and agricultural 
growth in countries with greater economic freedom. Therefore, when economic freedom increases and financial 
service investments come into a country, any policy to boost banking competition becomes necessary. In this phase, 
as well, industrial sector is more important than agricultural sector.
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1. Introduction 
 
The 1997 Asian crisis and the 2008 US crisis have revealed how the excessive risk 
taking by banking institutions can cause economic vulnerability which ended up in financial 
crisis. Banking competition is then often blamed for banking fragility in both developed and 
developing countries. Nevertheless, banking competition in some cases may also improve 
bank efficiency which in turn reduces intermediation costs for borrowers and matters for 
economic growth. In the context of Asia, the rapid growth of banking consolidations after the 
1997 Asian crisis has changed the structure of banking market. As of 2003, M&As growth in 
Asian banking reached the 23% level per year. However, the impact of such consolidations on 
firms’ financing constraints and hence, economic growth in Asia is not yet well-explored until 
nowadays. Likewise, the implementation of the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 
(ACFTA) recently induces policy makers to reshape any strategy to take advantage of such a 
trend, so that long-run economic growth towards a prosperous Asia can be achieved.  
 As a matter of fact, there are at least two relevant factors beyond free trade and 
regional integration which are somehow ignored in the contemporary debate (Moshirian 
2009). These consist of financial globalization and the quality of institutional environments. 
By awaring of the advantage of financial globalization, a country will gain more capital 
inflow which can be allocated to boost productive sectors. In turn, the development of 
productive sectors matters for increasing exports and the quality of economic growth. To 
boost financial globalization, institutional quality that ensures investor rights' protections is 
necessary.  
With regards to the trend of financial globalization, it is also worthy to note that the 
2010 Greek crisis has increased capital inflow into Asia. At the beginning of 2010, capital 
inflow to developing countries reached USD 722 billion, while only USD 435 billion in 2009. 
It is also indicated that a large part of such foreign capital flows to Asia, the most promising 
region (Suchanek and Vasishtha 2010). From such trends, capital inflow might influence 
financial services development and macroeconomic dynamic in Asia, since capital inflow 
could be in a form of foreign direct investment or financial services investments (Moshirian 
2008). This paper deals with the latter issue.  
Specifically, we build a bridge between the finance-growth nexus and financial 
globalization issues by considering that greater financial service investment entering Asia 
may result in an increase in the degree of competition in Asian banking. Since there is no 
previous study investigating the impact of bank competition on macroeconomic performance 
in Asia, this paper attempts to fulfill this gap. Aside from investigating the competition-
growth nexus in general, we also disentangle economic development with respect to different 
economic sectors (agriculture and industry), a procedure that has never been taken into 
consideration in the previous literature. Building on the argument of Moshirian (2009) we 
further investigate the role of institutional development in affecting the competition-growth 
nexus.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
and describes our research focus. Section 3 describes brief institutional backgrounds from 
Asian countries used in the study. Section 4 lays out data, variables and descriptive statistics. 
Section 5 describes methodology and econometric specification. Section 6 discusses empirical 
results. Section 7 provides several sensitivity analyses, while Section 8 concludes the paper.   
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2. Existing Literature and Research Focus 
 
In the academic literature, the impact of banking competition on economic 
development is mixed. The conventional wisdom suggests that in a market without 
asymmetric information, banking competition leads to higher economic growth. This is 
because banking market power results in higher loan pricing and less loan availability (Black 
and Strahan 2002, Degryse and Ongena 2005, Cetorelli and Gamberra 2001). Conversely, in a 
market with asymmetric information, higher banking concentration may increase banks’ 
incentive to invest in relationship lending based on soft informations. As a result, such 
mechanism reduces firms’ financing constraints, facilitates the availability of credit, and 
boosts economic growth (Boot 2000, Petersen and Rajan 1994, Petersen and Rajan 1995, 
Berlin and Mester 1998, González and González 2008).  
 With regards to the nature of bank competition, Boot and Thakor (2000) build a 
theoretical model with two forms of competition: capital market competition and inter-bank 
competition. Banks focusing on competition with capital market tend to invest in transaction-
based lending. On the contrary, inter-bank competition creates incentives to differentiate a 
bank from other banks, thereby it positively affects relationship lending as a value-added   
strategy. This is because relationship banking will charge lower interest rate of loans to small 
businesses. 
 Further developments on the link between bank competition and relationship lending 
can not be separated from bank consolidation, e.g mergers and acquisitions (M&As). 
According to Frohlich and Kavan (1999), there are four motivations behind M&As : (1) 
creating economies of scales, (2) expanding geographically, (3) increasing the combined 
capital base (size) and product offerings, and (4) gaining market power. Berger et al. (1998) 
provide evidence that in static analysis, bank consolidation reduces small business lending as 
market power increases. This reduction could be influenced by other M&A banks' operation 
or individual distortion in management within the M&A banks themselves. 
 Conversely, Beck et al. (2004) find a positive link between bank market power and 
small firms' financing constraints. Since most of empirical studies focus on the US banking 
market with a specific regulatory and institutional effect, they focus on a cross-country 
setting. However, they only use bank concentration ratios to capture bank market power. They 
further indicate that the relation of bank market power and financing obstacles is dampened in 
countries with well developed institutions, higher levels of economic and financial 
development, and a larger share of foreign-owned banks. 
 Another contemporary issue is that bank market power could be more beneficial in 
solving adverse selection and moral hazard between firms and banks in developing markets 
with weak legal systems and poor institutional infrastructure. Meanwhile, by establishing 
long-term relationship, banks in these environments may solve optimally the problems with 
debtors (La Porta et al. 1998). Banking market power in these markets favors such a long-
term relationship and thereby, spurs economic growth. This is because banking market power 
may substitute for strong legal protection of creditors and property rights; and by establishing 
relationships, banking market power works in the absence of strong institutions to reduce 
information asymmetries and agency costs between banks and firms’ owners (Fernandez et al. 
2010).  
 From 80 countries consisting of developing and developed country over the period 
1980-2004, Fernandez et al. (2010) then provide evidence that bank concentration generally 
has a negative impact on economic growth. However, such a negative impact disappears in 
countries with poorer-quality institutional environments. This suggests that bank 
concentration contributes more to relationship lending developments when the poor quality of 
institutions impedes market developments. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Yoshitomi and 
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Shirai (2001) also argue that relationship lending is relevant in East-Asian economies, since 
the laws are poorly implemented and contract are not well enforced. In this case, the limited 
liabilities of financial information can give the relationship banking a degree of domination 
which protects their investment through long-term relationship.  
 Although our research is close to Beck et al. (2004) and Fernandez et al. (2010), our 
contribution is twofold. First, we opt for the new industrial organization approach following 
Uchida and Tstutsui (2005) to capture the degree of market power in banking instead of 
drawing bank concentration ratios used by Beck et al. (2004) and Fernandez et al. (2010). 
When our study focuses on the impact of bank consolidations on economic growth in Asia, 
the use of bank market power indicators is more appropriate than bank concentration 
indicators1. Second, we disentangle economic development into two types of indicator with 
respect to different economic sector (agricultural and industrial sector growth). This 
procedure allows us to capture different strategy to boost tradable sector and hence exports, 
regarding to the different nature of economic freedom and competition in the banking market.    
  
3. Brief Insitutional Background 
 
 We observe Asian countries that have been affected by the 1997 Asian crisis in which 
they have different economic structure and the degree of economic freedom. These countries 
include Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand that were severely devastated by the 
banking crisis, as well as China, India, Hong Kong, Pakistan, Philippines, and Taiwan that 
were less affected.  
 In Indonesia, the structure of economy is still dominated by agricultural sector. In 
2005, the labour force by occupation in agriculture reached 42.1%, while only 18.6% and 
39.3% in industry and service. In recent years, the growth rate of agricultural GDP (gross 
domestic product) has recovered to 3.45% per year during the period 2001-2006 (ICONE 
2008). Meanwhile, agricultural products are one of the main export commodities in Indonesia. 
However, Indonesian farmers are mainly small-scale farmers with inadequate expertise. It is 
also reported that small-scale farmers increase more than 2.4% per year since the nineties2.    
 Malaysia also still depends crucially on agricultural sector. Although the contribution 
of agricultural sector has declined from 18.7% in 1990 to 5.8% in 2005, Malaysia’s exports 
from several agricultural products continue to develop and the government increases its 
intervention in boosting agricultural sector development (ICONE 2008).  
 In Thailand, the role of agricultural sector is still crucial, notably in the post-2000 
period. The contribution of agricultural sector to alleviate unemployment can also be well 
maintained (Zamroni 2006). Thailand is also one of the world’s top ten exporters of processed 
foods, where the share of processed foods export to agricultural product export jumped from 
25% in 1988 to 35% in 2005 (ICONE 2008).  
 Among other Asian countries in our sample, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan 
are the ones that depend on industry instead of agriculture. In China, agricultural sector still 
plays a major role in the economy. China has always been one of the world’s largest 
producers of grain (including rice, wheat, corn, beans, and tubers), and this remains their 
largest output today. Fruit is also a commodity that has grown significantly since 20003. 
Meanwhile, India also depends crucially on agricultural sector.  During the period 2006-2007, 
                                                 
1
 This is because one of motivations behind bank M&As is to obtain higher market power (Frohlich and Kavan, 
1999). DeYoung et al. (2009) provides a more comprehensive view on the link between bank consolidation and 
market power in which banks are likely to gain greater market power after consolidation. On the contrary, 
consolidation does not itself necessarily create more concentrated banking market. 
2
 Agriculture Census (2003), National Bureau of Statistic, Indonesia 
3
 See Agriculture Yearbook (2006), http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/indexeh.htm  
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agriculture accounts for 18% of India’s GDP, while more than 43% of India’s geographical 
area is used for agriculture. In Pakistan, the role of agricultural sector is still important, even 
though Pakistan has been a semi-industrialized country. In average, agriculture accounts for 
about 23% of Pakistan’s GDP and employs about 44% of the labor force. Similarly, although 
Philippines is a newly industrialized country, agricultural sector still plays a crucial role in the 
economy. Agriculture accounts for 34% of Philippines’s GDP, while industry only accounts 
for 15% of Philippines’s GDP.   
 
4. Data, Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
 
We retrieve the data from several sources. Bank-level data come from BankScope 
Fitch IBCA to construct a sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of annual series for the 
period 1999–2007. We consider all commercial banks established in 10 countries in Asia 
(China (137), Hong Kong (53), India (74), Indonesia (80), Malaysia (51), Pakistan (30), 
Philippines (41), South Korea (21), Taiwan (49), and Thailand (23))4. Following Laeven 
(1999) who study Asian banks, we focus only on commercial banks because commercial 
banks tend to have more freedom to choose their business mix and face similar restrictions 
across countries. Country-level data are retrieved from the Asian Development Bank’s 
statistics. The countries’ financial structure data come from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009), 
and institutional development (economic freedom) data come from Heritage Foundation.  
 
4.1. Bank Competition 
 
The most important step in assessing banking market power is the choice of a 
competition measure. Claessens and Laeven (2004) argue that performance measures such as 
banks’ net interest margin or profitability do not appropriately indicate the competitiveness of 
a banking industry. These measures can be influenced by a number of factors such as country 
specific performance and stability, the form and the degree of taxation of financial 
intermediation, the quality of institutions, and bank-specific factors.  
 Beck (2008) also highlights that traditional indicators of competition based on market 
structure and concentration measures, such as the number of banks operating in the industry, 
the Herfindahl index (HHI index), as well as concentration ratios, are rather crude measures 
that do not take differentiation strategies into consideration. For instance, banks may not 
compete directly with each other in the same line of business products. Hence, such indicators 
only capture the actual market share without allowing inferences on the competitive behavior 
of banks.  
 Meanwhile, the use of the H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987) can be an 
alternative to infer the level of competition in the banking industry (Claessens and Laeven 
2004). Nevertheless, a critical feature of the H statistic is that the Panzar-Rosse approach must 
be applied on the basis of observations that are in long-run equilibrium. An equilibrium test 
needs to be conducted by equalizing adjusted rates of return across banks. At equilibrium, the 
rates of return will not be correlated with input prices. When the equilibrium test is rejected, 
then the H estimates should be interpreted with great caution, as they may be based on 
observation from a disequilibrium situation (Bikker and Bos 2008). 
 For such reasons, we opt for the new industrial organisation approach following 
Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) in quantifying the degree of market power in Asian banking. This 
method permits to estimate a more accurate measure of competition for the purpose of our 
study for at least three reasons. First, based on panel data techniques, it provides the estimates 
                                                 
4
 The distribution of banks is shown in parentheses.  
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of the degree of market power in the banking industry for each period. Second, this type of 
measure does not require any information on the market structure of each bank and a market 
equilibrium assumption. Third, this method allows us to determine the degree of market 
power endogeneously.  
 More precisely, we jointly estimate a system of three equations that correspond to a 
translog cost function, to a bank profit maximization revenue function, and to an inverse loan 
demand function (System (1)). In defining revenue, we follow Brissimis et al. (2008) using 
total revenue from both interest and non-interest revenue5. This construction allows us to 
implicitly capture the implications of a shift from interest activities to non-interest activities 
for bank profitability, a trend which has been observed in most banking systems around the 
world.  
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 Variables with bars are deviations from their cross-sectional means in each time period  
to reduce multicollinearity. The degree of competition in each year is given by [ ]1,0∈tθ  
representing the well-known conjectural variations of elasticity of total industry outputs with 
respect to the output of bank i. In the case of perfect competition, 0=tθ  ; under pure 
monopoly, 1=tθ  ; and finally, 0<tθ implies pricing below marginal cost and could result, 
for example from a non-optimizing behavior of banks. In the special case of Cournot 
competition, jtθ  is simply the market share bank i.   
 Specifically, itC  is measured by total expenses from both interest and non-interest 
income activities, itq  by total earning assets, itd  by total deposits and short-term funding, itw  
by the ratio of operating expenses to total assets, itR  by total revenue, itr  by the ratio of 
interest expenses to total deposits, itp  by the ratio of total revenue to total earning assets, 
tGDPG  and itOPL  are factors that affect demand, defined as the growth of country-level real 
gross domestic product (GDP), and the ratio of operating expenses to total loans, respectively.  
 Following Brissimis et al. (2008), we perform country-level estimations and specify 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) method to solve System (1) . To estimate tθ  we 
use annual time dummy variables, while to estimate η  we use bi-annual time dummy 
variables (every two years). This is because the values taken by η  are linearly dependent on 
the time-specific control variable (GDPG) in the third structural equation of System (1). In the 
subsequent analyses, tθ  denotes the Lerner index (LERNER) of the banking industry in 
country j.  
                                                 
5Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) only consider revenue generated by bank loans.  
 6 
In this paper, we also consider the square term of banking market power ( 2LERNER ) 
to capture possible non-linearity effects of banking market power on economic development. 
To calculate 2LERNER , we set 2LERNER  equals to zero if LERNER is negative. 
 
4.2. Economic Development 
 
 As a proxy of economic development, we use the real GDP growth (GDPG) following 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) without a separate role for unemployment. Moreover, we also 
investigate economic development with respect to different economic sectors by incorporating 
the real GDP growth of agricultural sector (GDPGA) and industrial sector (GDPGI). All these 
data are taken from the Asian Development Bank’s statistics.  
 
4.3. Control Variables 
  
 Four control variables are included. First, we incorporate the initial real GDP in order 
to account the convergence of development in the economy6. Second, we add economic 
freedom index (ECOFREE) taken from Heritage Foundation. Greater economic freedom can 
boost private sector developments, reduce “home bias” for cross-border investments, and 
allows banks to improve efficiency by diversifying financial service products and market 
segments, and thus matters for economic growth. Third, bond market may also play a role in 
the economy. For such a reason the ratio of public and private bond market capitalisation to 
GDP (BOND) is considered as control variable. BOND is taken from Beck and Demirgüç-
Kunt (2009). Finally, as bank efficiency matters for economic development, the cost-to-
income ratio (CTI) is also considered as control variable.  CTI is defined as the aggregate ratio 
of total expenses to total income in the banking industry. CTI is taken from Beck and 
Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).  
 
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study. Several 
restrictions to our dataset are also applied in order to eliminate outliers. More precisely, in 
Equation (1), we clean w  and OPL by eliminating both their 2.5% lowest and 2.5% highest 
values, since both variables exhibit left-skewed and right-skewed distributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 We include GDP_INI, GDPA_INI, and GDPI_INI to capture respectively the initial real GDP in general, in 
agricultural sector, and in industrial sector.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Variables Definition  Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev. 
       
Q Total earning assets (million USD) 10580572 717091.5 8.63E+08 40.874 44235815 
C Total expenses (million USD) 562126.1 56354 43603212 -959907 2070488 
D 
Total deposit and short term funding (million 
USD) 9576041 682700 8.04E+08 7 39528240 
R Total revenue (million USD) 591999.3 63987.5 39037317 -131340 2102181 
W Total operating expenses to total assets  0.570559 0.02106 24.7477 1.54E-08 2.334638 
R 
The ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits 0.052744 0.029492 9.390108 8.27E-05 0.321224 
P 
The ratio of total revenue to total earning 
assets 0.085879 0.059908 26.5119 -0.41208 0.46607 
OPL The ratio of operating expenses to total loans 0.052548 0.036881 0.326245 0.011159 0.04426 
CTI The ratio of total expenses to total income 0.6271 0.5855 1.43 0.3561 0.1939 
GDPG The annual growth rate of GDP 0.0064 0.0063 0.1140 -0.0022 0.0027 
GDPGA 
The annual growth rate of GDP from 
agricultural sector 0.0257 0.0286 0.1268 -0.0807 0.0349 
GDPGI 
The annual growth rate of GDP from 
industrial sector 0.0599 0.0594 0.1627 -0.0751 0.0437 
ECOFREE The Economic Freedom index  60.1197 55.20 90 42 11.448 
BOND The bond market capitalisation to GDP 0.376524 0.313223 1.069313 0.132142 0.214013 
 
5. Methodology and Econometric Specification 
 
 First, we generally investigate the link between bank competition and economic 
development by using two stages estimation. In the first stage, we estimate (1) in order to 
obtain the country-level Lerner index (LERNER) by using a panel from bank-level data. Table 
2 reports such Lerner index estimated from (1) using the SUR method.  
 
Table 2. The Country-level Lerner Index (LERNER). Higher Lerner is associated with less competition in 
banking market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
  China Hong Kong Indonesia India  South Korea 
1999 0.472297 0.301222 0.368994 -0.162399 0.248986 
2000 0.519364 0.287428 0.507071 -0.150857 0.268862 
2001 0.570741 0.428638 0.504237 -0.143449 0.395923 
2002 -1.000000 0.900392 0.489753 -0.118262 0.273264 
2003 -0.997717 0.935591 0.60836 -0.02357 0.410607 
2004 0.869957 0.70721 0.76211 0.000143 0.48544 
2005 0.822429 0.43478 0.730938 -0.026172 0.492796 
2006 0.797712 0.285657 0.688297 -0.075694 0.475937 
2007 0.791171 0.366164 0.75164 -0.100164 0.357278 
  Malaysia Philippines Pakistan Thailand Taiwan 
1999 0.548657 0.561692 0.404705 0.516515 0.161426 
2000 0.683819 0.496119 0.347082 0.502541 0.142652 
2001 0.712439 0.513135 0.571413 0.523875 0.192371 
2002 0.742263 0.635231 0.534409 0.498261 0.258088 
2003 0.75319 0.732586 0.641901 0.566692 0.314807 
2004 0.766969 0.545519 0.709296 0.721333 0.393059 
2005 0.775379 0.619123 0.666741 0.807386 0.355359 
2006 0.738516 0.638452 0.604942 0.761431 0.398816 
2007 0.716482 0.669991 0.600564 0.724995 0.383869 
  
 8 
In the second stage, we construct a panel with country-level data to estimate a regression 
model of economic development with LERNER and a set of control variables. For this 
purpose, we specify the following model  
 
),,,(
,
2
,, tjtjtj XLERNERLERNERINIfGROWTH =             (2) 
For country j at date t, GROWTH refers to the rate of economic growth and consists of 
GDPG, GDPGA, and GDPGI. Meanwhile INI refers to the initial level of real GDP and 
consists of GDP_INI, GDPA_INI, and GDPI_INI. X is a set of country-level control variables.  
 Second, the role of institutional development in affecting the competition-growth 
nexus is investigated. Following Fernandez et al. (2010), institutional development refers to 
the degree of economic freedom. To account for this dimension, we incorporate an interaction 
term between banking competition and economic freedom into the right-hand side of 
Equation (2) as follows 
 ),*
,,,(
,
2
,,
tj
tjtj
XLERNERECOFREE
LERNERLERNERINIfGROWTH =
             (3) 
Equation (2) and (3) are both estimated using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
random-effect estimation, since we have a time-invariant variable in the right hand-side of the 
equations. As well, random-effect model permits to control for unobserved heterogeneity on 
an individual country with different environments compared to other countries (Uhde and 
Heimeshoff, 2009).  
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Bank Competition and Economic Development 
 
 Table 3 (Regression 1 and 2) shows that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
LERNER and GDPG with an inflection point reaching the 0.36 level. From the distribution of 
LERNER, we notice that more than 70% of observation found above 0.36. This may suggest 
that although there is a U-shaped relationship between LERNER and GDPG, the relation 
between LERNER and GDPG tends to be positive.  
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Table 3. The impact of banking market power (LERNER) on economic growth (GDPG). The results are 
estimated using the Pooled OLS and Random-Effect estimation. The t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 When we disentangle GDPG into GDPGA and GDPGI, we find some interesting 
results. Table 4 (Regression 1 and 2) shows that higher banking market power (LERNER) 
improves agricultural sector growth (GDPGA), while there is no significant link between 
2LERNER  and GDPGA.  
 
Table 4. The impact of banking market power (LERNER) on agricultural sector growth (GDPGA). The results 
are estimated using the Pooled OLS and Random-Effect estimation. The t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable : GDPGA 
Explanatory Variables Pooled OLS (1) Random Effect (2)  Pooled OLS (3)  Random Effect (4) 
     
GDPA_INI 4.28E-05 4.28E-05 0.000039 0.000039 
 (1.104) (1.104) (1.319) (1.319) 
LERNER 0.0142** 0.0142** 0.0367** 0.0367** 
 (2.015) (2.015) (1.957) (1.957) 
LERNER2  -0.0011 -0.0011 0.0077 0.0077 
 (-0.0607) (-0.0607) (0.2345) (0.2345) 
Inflection Point - - - - 
     
ECOFREE -0.0013** -0.0013** -0.0011*** -0.0011*** 
 (-2.484) (-2.484) (-3.391) (-3.391) 
CTI 0.0235 0.0235 0.0242** 0.0242** 
Dependent Variable : GDPG 
Explanatory Variables Pooled OLS (1) Random Effect (2)  Pooled OLS (3)  Random Effect (4) 
     
GDP_INI -1.13E-06 -1.09E-06* -0.0000013* -0.0000013* 
 (-1.551) (-1.863) (-2.207) (-2.207) 
LERNER -0.0253*** -0.0216*** 0.0804* 0.0804* 
 (-3.001) (-3.449) (1.945) (1.945) 
LERNER2  0.0355* 0.0312** 0.0762*** 0.0762*** 
 (1.878) (1.891) (5.404) (5.404) 
Inflection Point 0.36 0.35 - - 
     
ECOFREE 0.00021 0.00017 0.0015** 0.0015** 
 (0.4029) (0.4095) (2.437) (2.437) 
BOND -0.0199* -0.0203** -0.0204** -0.0204** 
 (-1.733) (-2.155) (-2.602) (-2.602) 
CTI -0.0457*** -0.0449*** -0.0417*** -0.0417*** 
 (-3.151) (-4.021) (-4.499) (-4.499) 
LERNER*ECOFREE   -0.0023*** -0.0023*** 
   (-2.871) (-2.871) 
          
Number of Obsevation 90 90 90 90 
Adjusted R-square 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.23 
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Continued.      
 (1.154) (1.154) (2.509) (2.509) 
BOND 0.0122 0.0122 0.0119* 0.0119* 
 (0.7424) (0.7424) (1.771) (1.771) 
LERNER*ECOFREE   -0.00049 -0.00049 
   (-0.8308) (-0.8308) 
          
Number of Obsevation 90 90 90 90 
Adjusted R-square 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
 
 This finding can be explained by the indication that in some Asian countries, 
agricultural sector is dominated by small-scale farmers and enterprises (ICONE 2008). 
Consistent with the old wisdom on the link between bank competition and firms’ financing 
constraints, the opacity of small-scale farmers and enterprises dominating agricultural sector 
makes market power in banking more effective to develop relationship lending which leads to 
an increase in agricultural sector growth.  
 Conversely, a positive relationship between banking market power and economic 
growth disappears when we observe industrial sector. Table 5 (Regression 1 and 2) shows that 
there is no significant relationship between LERNER and GDPGI. 
 
Table 5. The impact of banking market power (LERNER) on industrial sector growth (GDPGI). The results are 
estimated using the Pooled OLS and Random-Effect estimation. The t-statistic values are reported in 
parentheses. Constants are included but not reported. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and 
(*) indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable : GDPGI 
Explanatory Variables Pooled OLS (1) Random Effect (2)  Pooled OLS (3)  Random Effect (4) 
     
GDPI_INI 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 9.63E-05*** 0.00009*** 
 (5.352) (4.361) (6.991) (5.302) 
LERNER -0.00077 0.0011 0.0873* 0.1068** 
 (-0.0577) (0.0866) (1.888) (2.2216) 
LERNER2  -0.0107 -0.0079 0.0256 0.0361 
 (-0.4237) (-0.3003) (0.8883) (1.19) 
Inflection Point - - - - 
ECOFREE -0.0018*** -0.0018*** -0.00083 -0.00061 
 (-6.117) (-4.901) (-1.309) (-0.7978) 
CTI 0.0294* 0.0222 0.0316** 0.0253 
 (1.715) (1.139) (2.197) (1.43) 
BOND 0.0442*** 0.0396** 0.0435** 0.0375* 
 (2.865) (2.115) (2.551) (1.85) 
LERNER*ECOFREE   -0.0019** -0.0023** 
   (-2.112) (-2.362) 
          
Number of Obsevation 90 90 90 90 
Adjusted R-square 0.39 0.27 0.39 0.25 
 
 With regards to the economic structure of Asian countries in our sample, these results 
are quite interesting. For countries relying on industrial sector, such as Hong Kong, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, we can observe that from Table 2, their average Lerner index is relatively 
lower than the one observed in other Asian countries relying on agriculture sector, such as 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand. This observation supports our 
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empirical finding, where banking market power has no significant relationship with industrial 
growth.    
    
6.2 When Institutional Development Matters 
  
 In Table 3 (Regression 3 and 4), we also investigate whether institutional development 
captured by the degree of economic freedom affects the link between bank competition and 
economic growth. We observe that in countries with greater economic freedom, higher 
banking market power (LERNER) deteriorates economic growth in general (GDPG). The 
positive relationship between LERNER and GDPG only occurs in countries with less 
economic freedom.  
 Interesting finding also appears when we observe industrial sector. Table 5 
(Regression 3 and 4) reports that in countries with greater economic freedom, higher banking 
market power (LERNER) deteriorates industrial sector growth (GDPGI). Also, the positive 
relationship between LERNER and GDPGI only occurs in countries with less economic 
freedom.  
 Conversely, in agricultural sector, Table 4 (Regression 3 and 4) shows that there is no 
significant relationship between the interaction term (ECOFREE*LERNER) and agricultural 
sector growth (GDPGA). Meanwhile, a positive relationship between LERNER and GDPGA 
still occurs, although we incorporate ECOFREE*LERNER as explanatory variable. This 
further suggests that banking market power is important to promote agricultural sector growth 
only in countries with less economic freedom.  
   
 
7. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
In order to ensure the robustness of our results, we perform several sensitivity 
analyses. For brevity, the results of these sensitivity analyzes are not reported in the paper but 
are available from the author on request. 
 First, we include bank concentration ratio measured by the total asset of the three 
largest banks in a country (CONC). This data is provided by Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2009). Using this specification, we perform again the pooled OLS and random-effect 
estimation to estimate (2) and (3). The main findings obtained in Section 6 are not altered.  
 Second, we modify our estimation method to quantify the degree of market power in 
the banking industry by considering other variables than OPL (the ratio of operating expenses 
to total loans) in the demand function shown in System (1). These variables consist of the 
ratio of stock market capitalisation to GDP (or STMKTCAP) and the inflation rate (INF), 
since both of them may influence the demand for banking services. The data for STMKTCAP  
and INF are retrieved from Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009) and International Financial 
Statistics, respectively. Using this alternative specification does not alter our findings 
discussed in Section 6.  
 Finally, for consistency with the majority of papers on cost efficiency/market power in 
the banking literature, Agoraki et al. (2009) use the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method 
(MLE) instead of running the SUR method used by Brissimis et al. (2008) and Uchida and 
Tsutsui (2005). Hence, we also run the MLE method for System (1) instead of using the SUR 
method. Overall, our results in Section 6 remain unchanged.  
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8. Conclusion 
  
 This paper deals with the impact of bank competition on economic development. In 
the context of Asia where bank consolidation grows with high rapidity, it is important to 
investigate such a trend on economic development. This research is also motivated by the 
argument that financial globalization becomes an important issue beyond the free trade 
implementation (Moshirian 2009).  
 Using a sample of Asian countries over the period 1999-2007 we find that banking 
market power is important to boost economic growth in general, although banking market 
power also exhibits a U-shaped relationship with economic growth. Interestingly, we further 
show that the positive impact of banking market power on economic growth only occurs in 
agricultural sector. In industrial sector, there is no significant impact of banking market power 
on industrial sector growth. 
  When we construct an interaction term between banking market power and economic 
freedom, we observe that industrial sector is more sensitive than agricultural sector to respond 
such an interaction term. For industrial sector, banking market power in countries with higher 
economic freedom tends to deteriorate industrial sector growth. Consequently, we may 
indicate that when economic freedom increases and financial service investments enter a 
country, banking competition becomes necessary and industrial sector needs to be taken into 
close consideration. Finally, overall economic growth can be improved.  
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